Archive for March, 2012
The Weak Case Against the Drug War
This article originally appeared in National Review on March 13, 2012
The drumbeat is starting on the left over what an emboldened, reenergized Barack Obama should focus on in his second term. (There is the inconvenience of an election first, but polling numbers and the job-creation data are inviting enough to make Democrats giddy and eager to drop any veil of centrist intentions.) On the African-American left, the momentum is building for a rollback of the War on Drugs. This is a consistently vague agenda; it shifts from legalizing marijuana, to freeing police resources for more urgent matters, to comprehensive sentencing reform, and all points in between. But at its worst, it is a dangerously misplaced priority, and a sad reminder of the leadership vacuum in the one community that is trapped in a depression.
To be sure, critics of the War on Drugs have some indisputable facts on their side: Prisons at the federal and state level are crowded with relatively inconsequential, low-level dealers who are hardened by their stint behind bars, and who are often rendered permanently voteless and jobless when they resurface. A disproportionate number of those men, and ever so occasionally women, are black, a factor that helps give prisons the ugly look of a barricaded ghetto. (See Michelle Alexander’s best-seller The New Jim Crow.) Add to that the disparities in how our laws punish dealing in cocaine as opposed to methamphetamine or marijuana — or even “crack,” the rock-like substance derived from cocaine powder — and we see that the current system is outlandishly complex as well as unfair. Finally, there is the poor “kill” rate for the kingpins who are the intended targets. The war never keeps pace with the almost instantaneous succession rate in the drug trade; the critics even contend that aggressive prosecution only pumps up the illicit-drug market, by running up the value of drugs as a threatened commodity.
Most of these flaws have a valid remedy that policymakers should consider. (The supply-and-demand theory is the flimsiest; it would apply only in a fantasy world in which all narcotics were legal and unrestricted.) For example, there ought to be wide reforms in the criminal-justice process. Federal judges should have the flexibility to depart from mandatory minimums in crack cases; the innovation of drug courts, introduced in some localities, ought to be explored in the federal system, along with a range of alternative-sentencing options for small-time players. There are appalling weaknesses in the bar of court-appointed lawyers for indigent defendants (especially at the state level), which result in too many felony guilty pleas by first-time offenders. All these shortcomings need to be addressed.
But the War’s sharpest critics would probably consider all of the above to be piecemeal and tepid. Their rhetoric, if not their specific proposals, suggests that they would be dissatisfied with any regime that stresses incarceration and punishment, and that they would distrust even a system that treats the bit players differently from the ringleaders. According to this view, the status quo is so steeped in disparity and so invidious in its purpose that it would take something quite close to disarmament to undo the damage.
Michelle Alexander’s recent work, for example, explicitly ties the origins of the War to the rise in conservative, law-and-order politics and to a backlash against the assertiveness of the civil-rights movement. Her charge ignores the objective facts that (1) the crack trade exponentially expanded in the Eighties, and (2) the users who were maimed by the drugs and their trade were overwhelmingly African-American. Her book offers a strangely sympathetic treatment of the viciously predatory men who ran that trade and built mini-fortunes from it. Instead of being Alexander’s lost generation, they were essentially murderers whose weapons of choice were vials and pipes, and who did their killing from a distance; it is horribly implausible to suggest that without a crackdown on drugs, they were headed for a life of good citizenship. (According to theNew York Times, James Forman Jr. — son of the civil-rights leader — makes a version of this argument in an upcoming article in the New York University Law Review. He makes the equally valid point that drug offenders are less than a fourth of the current prison population.)
John McWhorter, in The New Republic, makes a claim even more circuitous than Alexander’s: that it’s the drug crackdown — and not the drug epidemic itself, or the explosion of births out of wedlock, or crushing poverty, or abysmal education, or the insidious gang culture — that is responsible for the rise in inner-city alienation. That is a sweeping underestimation of every destructive trend in distressed communities, and it is as single-mindedly wrong as Alexander’s effort to read right-wing politics into what was, after all, predominantly a crackdown on black-on-black crime. (It is worth noting that, for all their flaws, drug sentences are the rare instance in which crimes with black victims are consistently punished severely.)
There is of, course, a cruel set of ironies at work here. In associating the devastated lives of young, poor black men so tightly with the War on Drugs, liberals are doing exactly what the most unfeeling conservatives do when they collapse all inner-city black men into vignettes of current and future street criminals. In arguing that incarceration and punishment drive poverty in the black community, the Left is unintentionally mimicking the Right’s bias that poverty is secondary to a pattern of criminal irresponsibility in the destruction of the ghetto. In its zeal to encourage a radical scaling back of the drug laws, the Left is short-changing the importance of education, jobs, and community reinvestment — in other words, it is de-emphasizing priorities in the same way the Right is accused of doing.
This is a classic sign of leadership that has analyzed its way into disarray. More pointedly, the overheated arguments against the War on Drugs are an unwelcome sign that the politics of victimization are hardly dying out with the fall of a Sharpe James, or the mainstreaming of an Al Sharpton, or the exposure of a Kwame Kilpatrick. I recall that Jesse Jackson used to talk about new wine being poured into old wineskins.
Are Republicans Satisfied With the Candidate Field
From Boston, Artur Davis recently took time to speak with Fox News on the state of the Republican candidate field. Please click below to view the clip in full.
The Real Alabama Republican Primary
There is a hard to miss media bias against the relevance of trends that start in Alabama. That partly explains why a popular, effective governor like Bob Riley received not a sliver of response to his nascent presidential ambitions, despite a record that compared well to Mike Huckabee and Rick Perry; and why the weirdness of the state’s teacher union linking arms with a conservative Republican in the last governor’s race drew no national coverage–despite an ad by the union (an arm of the liberal NEA) pillorying a more moderate Republican for backing “Barack Obama’s federal takeover of our schools”. The theory seems to be that the state is too self-consciously parochial, too doused in racial embers, for its politics to deserve much scrutiny. The state’s controversial immigration law and its perennial political corruption merit national mentions largely for the stereotypes they reinforce.
No surprise, then, that one of the most striking primary races this cycle is a week away and entirely below radar. On March 13, the chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, Spencer Bachus, faces a challenge from a state legislator who has cultivated Tea Party support and challenged the incumbent as a Washington enabler. The race is thought to be competitive and the 20 year incumbent could well lose.
The challenger, a state senator named Scott Beason, has the kind of tangled history that makes Alabama politicians so confounding for outsiders to understand. A few years ago, Beason was entangled in the same grassroots snare he has set for his current rival: a clumsy vote to raise legislative pay brought him the ire of conservative activists, and a reputation for being a Republican with vaguely moderate inclinations.
But Beason discovered the potency of two lightning rods: immigration and the state’s powerful gambling lobby. He refashioned himself as the champion of a hawkish immigration law whose open purpose is to make the state unlivable for illegal immigrants by threatening them on as wide an array of fronts as possible. It is reviled in national liberal circles, but wildly popular with the state’s Republican electorate. Then, in a twist that sounds like John Gresham crafted it, Beason wore a federal wire in the spring of 2010 to snag the state’s casino bosses in a bribery scheme. The Democratic Party’s ferocity in attacking that probe has given him, in a Republican primary, the gift of convenient enemies.
In a climate where lengthy congressional service is already suspect, Bachus bears two extra burdens: the revelation that he made potentially hundreds of thousands of dollars (a number he hotly disputes) in stock transactions has gotten him labeled as an inside trader who profited from his access to sensitive economic data. Second, the largest county in the district, Jefferson, has spiraled into a bankruptcy that is tied to a disastrous refinancing of the county’s sewer repair bills by Wall Street investment giants. While Beason has handled the issue of bankruptcy gingerly (in most Republican circles, corruption by local Democratic officials is the real culprit), local media has been less circumspect, and has tied Bachus to the same banks through a history of campaign dollars. Beason has had no qualms in probing the same connections through Bachus’ support of the TARP bailout.
The peculiarities of Alabama politics have given the campaign a shape than an outsider wouldn’t recognize. Bachus’ latest ads improbably tie the allegations of insider trades to Barack Obama inspired Democrats and invite the district’s primary voters to send Obama a message. Beason has assailed banks with a zeal that Democrats in other states would recognize. Neither the slew of bad publicity around the immigration law, nor a federal judge’s findings challenging Beason’s credibility, have figured prominently in the race. This much is familiar: the whole of the state’s Republican establishment has rallied around Bachus over Beason, whose broader ambitions and sharp intra-party elbows have won him numerous GOP detractors; in turn, Beason has worn the outsider’s mantle as a point of pride.
Bachus, even with his liabilities, might well win. He is a certifiable conservative who has some of the deepest roots in the state’s relatively young Republican Party, and he is substantially better funded. Presumably, he will have a strong edge in the upscale suburbs that house most of Jefferson County’s white professional base, which happens to have strong links to the financial services sector and the law firms that represent it. But the 6th District’s rural and its middle income base–its quota of what the DC elite calls Walmart Republicans–was strengthened in redistricting; there, Washington and its sins are as anathema as gambling and illegal immigration, the populist edge is distinct, and Beason’s enemies seem liberal and sanctimonious.
This is all, perhaps, the shadow of another fight on the horizon. The southern Republican Party has grown by absorbing both suburbanites in the region’s metropolitan corridors and rural downscale voters who are ancestral Democrats: they have been forfeited by machine dominated, interest group controlled local Democrats who have drifted steadily to the left on social issues. The price of gaining so much new ground is fissures in substance as well as tone. Bachus and Beason are perfectly emblematic of two different strands of southern Republican partisans: a business oriented, image conscious establishment whose conservatism is grounded in an antipathy toward taxes, regulation, and predatory trial lawyers; and a more raw, emotionally charged conservatism that has a sore spot toward elites, and a willingness to stir the passions on social issues.
If Beason prevails, the southern Republican establishment’s grip seems just a little more tenuous. Beason’s brand of confrontation topped with populism will be credited with his rise, and nothing breeds imitation in politics like success. The Sixth District is worth watching for the rumble of a storm brewing. Then again, the national media would say, it’s only Alabama.
Response – Of Breitbart and Limbaugh
-My essay on Andrew Breitbart and Rush Limbaugh drew several strong reactions from readers who felt that it pulled too many punches. One reader wanted to know why a blog that touts its commitment to civil discourse did not effect more anger at two individuals who unmistakably represent the opposite value. In fairness, I doubt Breitbart’s fans would take much heart at my criticism of his take-down of Shirley Sherrod and my minimization of his Anthony Weiner expose; I am also reasonably sure that my description of Limbaugh as a perfect foil for liberals who want to blast conservatism is not the role he and his admirers believe he plays.
But I do plead guilty to the offense of not devoting an essay solely to the outrageousness in both men’s history. Certainly, there are parts of Breitbart’s legacy that deserve it (and David Frum’s blog was quite courageous in his devastation of that legacy); Limbaugh’s recent offensiveness is so gross that even his imminently forgiving sponsors have pulled back. But I think there is a value in my observation as to what the two reveal reveal about the political movement they epitomize for so many. Whatever lift their work has given the Right, I have argued that both men have injured it and contributed to a defensive culture that makes conservatism look weaker and more futile than it is. To be sure, that is not the defect that some want to hear, but it is a real one and conservatives would do well to reflect on it.
-The reactions to the Breitbart/Limbaugh piece reminded me of an occasional question I receive. One right-leaning version of it is “whose side are you on, and if it is conservatives, spare the occasional criticism”. Another version is “your views are hard to follow because they don’t fit one camp or another”. The best I can offer is that no, this is not a website that will cheer-lead for any particular viewpoint. Anyone who has perused the entries knows that there is a sympathy for conservatives, particularly the center-right brand that has more creativity to offer our politics than does the left. You may also find a skeptical tone toward orthodoxy, left or right, that doesn’t stand up to scrutiny, or toward politicians or movements whose reputation for boldness exceeds their bite (see my thoughts on both Bob Kerrey and Americans Elect, and my comments on Olympia Snowe and Senate moderates below). But a consistent pitch for one cause or side? This is not the place you will find it.
-Lastly, some readers asked my thoughts on Olympia Snowe’s retirement. The short of it is that as gracious as Snowe is (no small attribute on the Hill), I never viewed her as ground-breaking. She, and Ben Nelson, and Blanche Lincoln, and Jim Webb, are all examples of admirable people who pondered and signaled breaking party ranks more than they ever actually broke them. While the fault lies partly with their party structures and the pressure toward uniformity on both sides, I have often wondered how the last four years might have differed if the aforementioned, and a few others like Mark Warner and Mary Landrieu, had combined to craft alternatives on healthcare, financial reform, immigration, entitlements, and job creation. I think it is arguable that on the first two, in particular, they might have actually seized the debate and written law. At a minimum, such a putative center bloc would have shifted the argument away from “do everything” v. “do nothing”.
Another Bob Kerrey Boomlet
This piece originally appeared in Politico on March 2, 2012
Count Bob Kerrey’s Senate candidacy in Nebraska as rich in irony: in a season of colorless candidates, he is a quotable, unscripted burst of candor. He is a 69 year old moderate who will ignite the young, and very left-leaning, blogosphere. He is a small state candidate whose fund-raising is bound to be East Coast and West Coast driven-a kind of mini-presidential figure for a party weak in national stars.
The less flattering irony, though, is that Kerrey is a flash of excitement, but one who always ends up disappointing: it’s a good bet that’s where all of this is headed again.
If your memory is long, you recall the phase in 1991 when Kerrey thrilled Democratic activists by entering the presidential race. He was the youthful, authentic war hero who turned drab things to gold—earning millions in small business, electrifying Democrats in Nebraska, of all places, and doing it with a then celebrated actress on his arm. He had an RFK like social conscience to boot—in the pre-internet era, a tape of him bringing a Mississippi audience to tears with a soaring riff about child poverty was all the rage. More than the Arkansas governor who seemed just a little too conservative, and who spawned too many whispers, it was Kerrey who seemed poised to revive a party.
Then, for the first time, Kerrey turned gold back to dust. He rambled and lost crowds too easily. His message rambled too, from universal healthcare to trade protectionism, from high-minded appeals to national service, to nasty jabs about Bill Clinton missing the war that maimed Kerrey. Soon after New Hampshire, he was gone from the race, and it’s not well remembered he was ever there.
The Senate seemed uninteresting to Kerrey after that. His peak of engagement was the summer of 1993, when he ostentatiously threatened to derail Clinton’s budget and when deficit reduction became his fixation. He turned in a stint chairing one of Washington’s perennial deficit commissions, but he was a bystander when the hard work of crafting a balanced budget dominated the mid nineties.
In 1999, he flirted hard with challenging Al Gore for the succession to Clinton. There was, once again, a flurry, a hint that he would run on a boldness of purpose that Clinton and Gore never delivered, but then Kerrey shut it down; and for good measure, got out of politics, and Nebraska, altogether. In a decade in New York, the stars and donors he met along the way kept his name in circulation, enough to grant him a small college presidency that was high-profile but contentious, enough to make the far-fetched notion of a run for Mayor of New York City seem plausible.
As is Kerrey’s penchant, the content of what he offers is vague. The Democratic Party is narrower, much more orthodox and uninterested in deviation today than the one he encountered in the nineties: is it plausible he would challenge that rigidity now, when he was so diffident about leading when the climate was so much better for it? The prospect of being president didn’t hold his interest, leading one to wonder why being a septuagenarian senator would do the trick.
Kerrey’s admirers are numerous in a field where memories are ordinarily short—that’s to his credit. They often praise him for the fact that his inner security doesn’t revolve on whether he is in or out of politics. That seems true; so does the fact that not much at all really turns on whether Kerrey is in or out of politics.

